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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
STEVEN JAY DOOLITTLE,

Case No. 20030703-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop,
a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-13.5 (1998 & Supp. 2003), and
speeding, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-46 (1998). This
Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Should the Court entertain defendant's claim that State's Exh. #1 (a handwritten
witness statement) was sent into the jury room in violation of rule 17(1), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, where defendant never mentioned that rule below?
Defendant's rule 17(1) claim is unpreserved. Because defendant argues neither plain
error nor ineffective assistance of counsel, the claim is also procedurally barred. See State
v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5
(Utah 1995).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
This appeal does not depend on the interpretation of any constitutional provision,
statute, or rule.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-13.5 (1998 & Supp. 2003); speeding,
a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-46 (1998); passing on the
right, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-56, (1998); driving
on a denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked license, a class C misdemeanor, in violation
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-227 (1998) (Rl-2).
Following a jury trial on 17 April 2003, defendant was convicted for failure to
respond to an officer's signal to stop and speeding.1 R63. The trial court imposed the
indeterminate statutory term of 0-5 years for the third degree felony, and 90 days in jail for
the misdemeanor. R77.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R86.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
On the afternoon of 9 July 2002, Officer Burke, of the West Valley Police
Department, was working traffic patrol at 3910 South 2200 West. R92:45, 99. As he stood

]

The other charges appear to have been dismissed prior to trial. See Rl 5.

2

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2, 12 P.3d 92.
2

on the west side of 3911 South, he saw "a blue car [] traveling northbound at a high rate of
speed." R92:47, 51, 102. Officer Burke pointed his "laser gun" at the "grill area" on the
blue car, which revealed that the car was traveling "30 miles per hour" over the speed limit.
R92:52,100, 107. Officer Burke "stepped out in the roadway," "waved [his] arm back and
forth[,] then held it stationary and said [c]Stop.[c]" R92:52-53, 104. The blue car pulled
"[completely onto the shoulder" and began "slowing to a stop" "under five miles an hour."
R92:55-56,106. Through the rolled down window on the passenger side, Officer Burke told
the driver to, "Pull over." R92:55-56, 105-106. He saw the female passenger's face when
"she turned to look at [him]" and he also saw the "the right side of [the male driver's] face."
R92:107. He described the driver as a white, thin male with brown hair. R92:108. As the
car came "close to a complete" stop, Officer Burke turned and "walked over to [his] bike, set
[his] laser on the seat, picked up [his] ticket book and started walking towards the car,
approaching from the rear."

R92:57-58, 103.

The driver, however, "quickly"

"maneuvered]" the car "back to the left . . . into the—into the travel lane and continued
northbound." R92:58.
Officer Burke had given the blue car's license plate number to dispatch when he first
stopped it, but when the car sped off, he "gave them the license plate number again and asked
them if there was anybody in the area that could maybe keep an eye out for the car." R92:5859. Dispatch reported that "the registered owner's address [was] somewhere . . . out of the
county." R92:61. Because "people don't update their information, their motor vehicle
information," Officer Burke decided to do additional computer research, to see if he "might
3

come up with something a little better." Id. Officer Burke entered the registered owner's
name, Linda Leonhardt, and "found an address for her somewhere in West Valley City."
R92:62. Officer Burke drove by the address on his way home and saw the blue car "parked
in front. . . of the residence." R92:59-60, 62. Because "patrol was rather busy," Officer
Burke decided to postpone his investigation until the next morning. R92:63.
At 9:30 a.m. the following morning, Officer Burke stopped by the residence, and
observed that the blue car was still parked outside. R92:63-64. Linda, the registered owner
was not at home, but Officer Burke was able to speak with her mother. R92:63-64. He asked
Linda's mother to have her "contact [him] when she got home." R92:65. Later that day,
dispatch advised Officer Burke that Linda was home and he returned to the residence to
speak with her. R92:65, 116.
Linda, who was also defendant's girlfriend, told Officer Burke that she was the owner
of the blue car and that defendant had "borrowed the car at approximately 12:00 o'clock" the
previous day. R92:12, 66-67. She also reported that defendant returned the car later in the
day at about 2:30 p.m. R92:67. Officer Burke had "seen the car and stopped it" at 2:15 p.m.
R92:67. Officer Burke gave Linda "a witness statement and asked to her to detail how the
car came to be lent out, how it was returned and any statements that were made when the car
was returned." R92:67-68. Linda "exhibited no cognitive difficulties while she was talking
to [Officer Burke] or writing up the statement." Id. No one else assisted Linda in writing her
statement. R92:98. See R93 (State's Exh. #1) (a copy is attached in the addendum). In her
written statement, Linda indicated not only that defendant had borrowed her car, but that "he
4

might have mentioned almost getting pulled over by a cop. [She] didn't ask any questions."
R93. Linda's written statement also included a physical description of defendant. Id.
In addition to her handwritten statement, Linda gave Officer Burke defendant' s phone
number and an idea of the "general area" where he lived. R92:68. With this information and
additional computer research, Officer Burke was able to find defendant's exact address.
R92:110-lll.
When Officer Burke called the phone number Linda had given him, a man answered
and identified himself as defendant. R92:69, 92. Officer Burke, who had previously
identified himself as an officer, asked defendant if he had been driving a blue car in the area
and if so why he did not stop when he was flagged over. R92:93. Defendant admitted he had
been driving a blue car and that he didn't stop because he was afraid that he had a warrant
out. Id. Officer Burke then asked defendant "if he knew that he had pushed another vehicle
from the—the northbound travel lane into the center left turn lane." R92:94. Defendant
replied that, "The guy was trying to cut [him] off." R92:94-95. Defendant agreed to meet
Officer Burke at 10:00 a.m. the next morning at defendant's home. R92:95. Officer Burke
said that it was his preference "to try to handle all of this by a traffic ticket, rather than
screening charges." R92:95-96. Defendant "seemed agreeable." R92:96. However, when
Officer Burke arrived the next morning, defendant was not at home. Id. Officer Burke never
heard from defendant again. R92:97.
At trial, Linda did not specifically "remember that [she] did or . . . did [not]" loan
defendant her car, but concluded that she "probably did, because [she] let everybody drive
5

[her] car a t . . . that time." R92:14. She remembered Officer Burke coming to her house and
was "sure" that she "answer[ed] his questions truthfully." R92:15. However, she claimed
not to remember what she told him. Id. Linda remembered writing the witness statement,
but reading it did not refresh her recollection. R92:16-18. Specifically, Linda claimed not
to recall the events happening as she had described in her written statement. R92:23, 30.
The only thing she claimed to remember was "something about the defendant giving [her]
the keys to the car." R92:20. The trial court overruled defendant's "cumulative" objection
to having Linda read her written statement aloud. R92:29-30. The trial court also allowed
the statement to be published and sent into the jury room. R92:42, 71-79, 120, 151-156.3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant waived his claim that Linda's handwritten witness statement was
erroneously allowed into the jury room under rule 17(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.,
because he did not mention it below. Because he fails to argue plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel on appeal, his claim is now procedurally barred. Even assuming,
arguendo, defendant had preserved his claim of error, he has not demonstrated any abuse
of the trial court's discretion in allowing the properly admitted exhibit to go out with the jury.
More importantly, defendant has not shown that he was unfairly prejudiced since the exhibit

3

The facts regarding the admission of Linda's handwritten statement are set out in
greater detail at pp. 8-15, infra, of the State's brief.
6

was merely cumulative of evidence the jury had already properly heard and he admitted to
the police officer both that was driving the car that day and that he had driven away.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT SHOULD NOT ENTERTAIN DEFENDANT'S CLAIM
THAT LINDA'S HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT WAS SENT INTO
THE JURY ROOM IN VIOLATION OF RULE 17(1), UTAH RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, BECAUSE DEFENDANT NEVER
BROUGHT THAT RULE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S ATTENTION
Defendant claims that State's Exh. #1, Linda's handwritten witness statement, was
erroneously allowed into the jury room during deliberations under rule 17(1), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.4 Aplt Br. at 2,11-12, 20. However, because defendant never brought
rule 17(1) to the trial court's attention, his claim is unpreserved. See State v. Holgate, 2000
UT 74,1| 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993). As
defendant argues neither plain error nor ineffective assistance of counsel, his claim of rule
17(1) error is procedurally barred. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995).
Finally, even if defendant had preserved his claim of error here, he fails to demonstrate any
abuse of the trial court's discretion in allowing the exhibit into the jury room or that allowing
the exhibit into the jury room was unfairly prejudicial.

4

Rule 17(1) provides,

[u]pon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them . . . all exhibits
which have been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in
the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits of
unusual size, weapons or contraband.
7

Proceedings Below. During the State's case-in-chief, and contrary to what she told
Officer Burke, Linda testified that she did not remember loaning her car to defendant in July
2002. R92:14. She did recall, however, writing "[her] statement on what happened"
R92:16. When the prosecutor showed Linda State's Exh. #1, she identified the document as
her handwritten witness statement. R92:16-18. The statement, however, did not refresh
Linda's recollection "about somebody borrowing [her] car." R92:17-19. All that Linda
claimed to remember was writing down "something about the defendant giving [her] the keys
to the car back later that afternoon

That's all I remember now." R92:20. She responded

affirmatively to the prosecutor's query, "you have a recollection of it now, but it's different
from that paper? .. . Exactly." R92:23.
Linda also recalled talking about the incident approximately four months prior to trial
when an "attorney or somebody called her." R92:24-25. Linda may have told the caller that
defendant brought her car keys to her at 2:00 or 2:30. R92:26-27, 31. Linda did not recall
speaking to defendant about her car, but believed that she was "probably mad because [she]
should have been home already." R92:27.
The prosecutor then asked Linda to read specific parts of her handwritten statement.
R92:27-28.

Defense counsel's "hearsay" objection was overruled.

R92:28.

Linda

responded, "I wrote that [defendant] might have mentioned almost getting pulled over by a
cop." Id. Linda then read from her statement: "The gal that he was with wanted a-wanted
a ride home and I asked him if he would run her home, it was like right around the corner.
And he—he just very quickly answered no, I'm done driving forever." Id.
8

The prosecutor pointed out that Linda's handwritten statement said that she was
"awake when [defendant] took the car to drive someone home," and Linda agreed. R92:29.
The prosecutor further pointed out that Linda's handwritten statement was contrary to her
testimony that she was "asleep and the car just disappeared and then [defendant] came back
with the keys; is that right?" Id. Linda responded, "Yeah, I—I don't recall exactly what my
statement was to the—the person on the phone to me as far as that goes,ccause—but that's
what I—that's what I'm remembering now." Id.
When Linda became increasingly confused about what she had said and when, the
prosecutor asked her to read the "entirety of the statement that you wrote and gave to the
policeman last year at some point in time[.]" Id. Defense counsel objected: "This is
cumulative, we already have the relevant portions out." R92:29-30. The trial court overruled
the objection. R92:30. Linda then read her statement:
. . . I let [defendant] take my car to run a friend to the store. When he returned,
about 2:30 or so, the girl that needed a ride to the store also needed a ride
home. I asked Steve if he would take her, since she is actually his friend, not
mine.
He answered me very quickly and sharply said, ["]No, I'm done driving
forever. ["] I think he might have mentioned almost getting pulled over by a
cop. I didn't ask any questions.
We were at his house on Parkway Avenue, Chesterfield, about 1300
West. [Defendant] is a small guy with a long face, crook teeth, sandy blond
hair, some—34 years old.
R92:30. See also R93 (State's Exh. # 1).

9

After reading the statement, Linda testified that while she could "remember sitting at
[her] kitchen table writing the statement/' she did not "remember that this is how it was."
R92:30. The only thing Linda claimed to remember was that she "was asleep and
[defendant] brang [sic] [her] keys back." R92:31.
On cross-examination, Linda testified that she was "wondering why [she] wrote that,
because to—I don't rec—I don't recall it as being this way." R92:37. When defense counsel
asked what her recollection was, Linda reiterated that she "woke up at 1:30 and [defendant]
wasn't there. I went to leave and my car was gone." R92:38. According, to Linda,
[defendant] "came in with [her] car—with [her] car keys," before she had to call her mother
for a ride. Id, She did not recall being awake when defendant left or giving him her keys.
R92:39.
On redirect, the prosecutor moved to admit Linda's handwritten statement or State's
Exh. #1. R92:42; R93. Defense counsel objected "for the reasons [she] stated to the
Court[.]" Id. The trial court "[o]verruled" the objection, ruling that "[t]he document goes to
the weight, not to the question of admissibility." Id, Defense counsel further objected on the
ground that Linda had not adopted the exhibit as her statement. Id, The trial court again
overruled the objection observing "[fjhat's for the jury to decide." Id, The prosecutor then
requested permission to publish the statement to the jury and defense counsel did not object.
Id, The trial court indicated that the exhibit was received and could be published. Id.
Following direct examination of Officer Burke, outside the presence of the jury,
defense counsel made a record of her objection to the admission of State's Exh. #1: "It does
10

not qualify under any exception to come into evidence and be admitted." R92:71. Defense
counsel argued that the handwritten statement was inadmissible because Linda was not
"unavailable" "under Rule 804[, Utah Rules of Evidence.]" R92:72-74. The prosecutor
interjected that Linda's statement was "a recorded recollection" under rule 803(5): "This
witness said she made this herself at a time less than 24 hours— . . . And it doesn't matter
whether she is available or not." R92:74-75. Defense counsel responded that the State could
not rely on rule 803(5) "because the State explicitly asked to have the exhibit admitted and
published to the jury, which it was. And that rule specifically excludes that event from
happening." R92:75. The prosecutor responded that the handwritten statement was also
admissible impeachment evidence under rules 607 and 613(b). R92:76. Defense counsel
disagreed that the statement itself was admissible under those rules. R92:77. Defense
counsel agreed, however, that the prosecutor "could question [Linda] about her prior
statement. The Court permitted him to do that. The issue is that it was published to the
jury." R92:77-78. The trial court took the arguments under advisement. R92:78.
Following direct examination of Officer Olson, outside the presence of the jury, the
trial court overruled defense counsel's objection to publication of the handwritten statement:
". .. [T]he court read the footnotes in that section and ind—and the footnotes indicated that
the statement that otherwise are—may be read into the record have also been permitted to be
received by the jury."5 R92:120. Defense counsel said that was "contrary to the rule." Id.

5

The trial court declined to expressly identify the rule he was referencing, see
R92:120-121, but as is set out in the body of this section, it becomes clear during later
11

The trial court observed that "[a] rule without an exception is a very unusual and poor rule."
Id. The trial court then ruled that State's Exh. #1
was read in its entirety into the record and then it was moved for admission
and the Court granted the motion and permitted the exhibit to be published.
And the footnote to that rule says that it's been done previously with the
Court's blessing. So, it is received—it has been received and the motion for
a mistrial based on the fact that it was published to the jury is denied.
R92:121.
Following the State's rebuttal closing argument, defense counsel asked the trial court
to reconsider its rule 803(5) ruling. R92:151. The trial court indicated that it had "read the
materials given in support of [defendant's] request for the Court to reconsider," but that
"[t]he Court's original ruling stands." Id. The trial court then allowed defense counsel to
"make whatever record you would like[.]" Id.

Defense counsel noted that she had

"previously obj ected to the actual written statement of Linda Leonhardt coming into evidence
and being published to the jury or taken back to the jury room," and then asked, "Is that

argument that the trial court was looking at rule 803(5) and the Advisory Committee Note
thereto. See R92:152-156. Rule 803(5) provides as follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness: . . . Recorded recollection. A
memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to
testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the
witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect
that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be
read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless
offered by an adverse party.

12

supposed to go back to the jury room?" R92:151-152. The trial court responded, "Yes."/d.
Defense counsel asked if the exhibit was not "illustrative, only?" Id. The trial court replied,
"—the exhibit was received, was it not?" Id. To which defense counsel responded, "Was it?
Okay.'Vd.
Defense counsel then argued that, "[i]n any event," Linda's statement was not
admissible under rule 803(5):
[P]ursuant to the rule, and it's 803, Subsection 5, of recorded recollection, that
actual statement itself could not be admitted into evidence as an exhibit. And
the Court permitted it to come in and there is an advisory committee note to
the Rules of Evidence that states that Utah Courts have sanctioned the
admission of the record as a past recollection contra to this rule.
R92:152. Defense counsel further argued that the case the trial court had relied upon failed
to support its ruling:
And I found the case that was relied upon in that note and it's called
Sagers v. International Smelting Company, 50 Utah 423, 168 [P.] 105 [(Utah
1917)]. The Utah Rules of Evidence, I don't believe, were adopted actually
until [sic] 1977, so it certainly precedes the rule in any event; but in the Sagers
case, which I was able to briefly read over the lunch hour, essentially there was
a witness who was testifying and he had written down some information
regarding acreages and crops, because that was what is—what was at issue in
that case and it was in Tooele.

And the court allowed him to rely upon that and to testify from that
record. However, there is no indication in this opinion that that actual
statement from the witness or memorandum from the witness that was relied
upon at the trial was ever admitted.
That's—so that is my objection. I don't think that the footnote is in the
advisory committee, [sic] you know, actually answers that issue for the Court.

13

My major objection was the fact that the—not the fact that it was read
to the jury, I understand that could happen, because she clearly could not
remember what she wrote in that statement; I have no objection to it being read
other than the ones I stated, but once it was read, it was published to the jury
and they passed that around before they went into deliberations, when it was
first admitted into evidence and of objection, I think it over-emphasizes that
statement as being testimony because they have it memorialized; whereas,
every other piece of testimony is in their head.
R92:152-155.
The prosecutor indicated that he had no objection "to the Court retrieving State's
Exhibit 1 from the jurors and telling them that they must rely upon their own recollections
regarding when that was read to the jury." R92:155. The prosecutor further indicated,
however, that it was "appropriate" for the jury to have
seen it because it was testified that it was in her own handwriting, there was
not writing upon it except hers and—well, with the exception of the case
number, I guess; I think it's important to see what kind of handwriting she had,
that it was deliberate and not hurried, not forced, but if the only objection is
that it should not be with the jury now, we have no objection to the Court
retrieving it from the jury.
R92:155-156. Defense counsel asserted that that was not her only objection and the trial
court reiterated its ruling that the statement was admissible. R92:156.
Waiver and Procedural Bar. Because defendant failed to raise rule 17(1) below as
a ground for keeping State's Exh. #1 from the deliberating jurors, his claim of error on appeal
is unpreserved. "Utah courts require specific objections in order to bring all claimed errors
to the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if
appropriate." Brown, 856 P.2d at 361 (citations and quotations omitted). See also Holgate,
2000 UT 74, T[ 11 ("c[T]he trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed
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error and, if appropriate, correct it.5") (quoting State v. Eldridge, 113 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah
1989)). "This specificity requirement arises out of the trial court's need to assess allegations
by isolated relevant facts and considering them in the context of the specific legal doctrine
placed at issue. For this reason, a general objection may be insufficient to preserve a specific
substantive issue for appeal." Brown, 856 P.2d at 361 (citing State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097,
1099 (Utah 1991)); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819,820-21 (Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 114
P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989)).
Here, the trial court admitted the evidence under rule 803(5). Defendant specifically
objected to publishing the letter to the jury on that basis. On appeal, defendant has
abandoned his argument that the letter should not have gone to the jury under rule 803(5).
Instead, he argues that rule 17(1) precluded the exhibit from going to the jury room. He never
mentioned rule 17(1) as a basis for the trial court to rule in his favor. Thus, the trial court
never had the opportunity to determine whether his ruling was erroneous under that rule.
Defendant's claim regarding rule 17(1) is therefore unpreserved. See Brown, 856 P.2d at 361;
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11. Because defendant argues neither plain error nor ineffective
assistance of counsel, his claim is also procedurally barred. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229,
n.5 (refusing to consider unpreserved claim because "Pledger [did] not argue that
'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error5 justifie[d] review of the issue").
*

*

*

Linda's Handwritten Statement was Admissible Non-Hearsay. Even assuming,
however, that defendant had preserved an objection under rule 17(1), the trial court properly
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allowed Linda's handwritten statement to be taken into the jury room. Linda's handwritten
statement was admissible non-hearsay under rule 801(d)(1):
Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: . . . The
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the
declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has
forgotten[.]
"In admitting a prior inconsistent statement, the court need only assure that 'the witness is
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an
opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests ofjustice otherwise require.'"
State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, t 24, 37 P.3d 1180 (quotation omitted) (upholding
admission of viclim's out-of-court statements on the alternative ground that they amounted
to prior inconsistent statements).
Here, Linda testified and was subject to cross-examination concerning her handwritten
statement, which she remembered writing, but claimed not to remember the events as she had
written them. See, e.g., R92:14-42. The hand-written statement contradicted her testimony
at trial. See R93. Linda's written statement thus qualifies as a prior inconsistent statement
under rule 801(d)(1). See Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, \ 24. See also State v. Taylor, 818
P.2d 561, 572-573 (Utah App. 1991) (recognizing that recanting witness's prior statements
to police, that defendant was a drug dealer and possessed the marijuana found, were properly
introduced as prior inconsistent statements under rule 801 (d)( 1)). Although the trial court did
not consider rule 801(d)(1) in determining that Linda's handwritten statement was
admissible, rule 801 (d)( 1) is an alternative ground for affirming the trial court's admissibility
16

ruling, which is "readily supported by the record and fully consistent with the trial court's
ruling." State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, f 10, 69 P.3d 293.6
Unlike rule 17(1), or even rule 803(5), there are not limitations under rule 801(d)(1)
on when a prior inconsistent statement—which is also handwritten—may be admitted as an
exhibit. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in publishing the statement or
allowing it into the jury room. Indeed, in Taylor, the State successfully moved in a similar
drug prosecution to admitted and published a recanting witness's "two prior written
statements under rule 801(d)(1). One was a transcript of a statement given by [the witness]
to the police, the other was her signed statement." 818 P.2d at 572. While it is clear these
exhibits were at least published to the jury, it less clear if they also went into the jury
room—though such would have been the practice. Id.
Moreover, Linda's handwritten statement had special relevance to the issue of her
emotional state at the time because Linda suggested in her trial testimony that she was
possibly confused or angry with defendant. See, e.g., R92:16-20,27-31,37-38. As pointed

6

"It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgement appealed from
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling
or action . . . ' " State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ 9, 76 P.3d 1159 (quoting Bailey v.
Bayles, 2002 UT 58,110, 52 P.3d 1158, in turn quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61,
Tf 18, 29 P.3d 1225) (additional citations omitted)); see also Limb v. Federated Milk
Producers Ass 'n9 23 Utah 2d 222, 225-26 n.2, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (1969). The
alternative theory, as here, "must also be sustainable by the factual findings of the trial
court." Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ 9, See also State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, If 17, 994
P.2d 1278 (affirming search as incident to arrest although district court found an
inventory search).
c
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out by the prosecutor, the jury was therefore entitled to examine Linda's handwritten
statement to determine if it was consistent with that of a thoughtful or a confused and angry
author. SeeR92:155A56. See State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,% 13, 973 P.2d 404 (recognizing
that "[bjecause the standard for determining whether evidence is relevant is so low, the issue
of whether evidence is relevant is rarely an issue").
Given the handwritten statement's special relevance to Linda's emotional state on these
facts, nothing in either rule 801(d)(1)... or rule 17(1) prohibited the jury from examining it
during their deliberations. In claiming error, defendant relies primarily on cases where
depositions and transcriptions with no special relevance or independent evidentiary value
were erroneously allowed into the jury room. These cases are thus unavailing. See e.g., State
v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 642 (Utah 1995) (harmless error to admit abstract of prior penalty
hearing transcript and allow it inside the jury room), cert, denied, 116 S.Ct. 163 (1995); State
v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5,14-15 (Utah 1984) (any error in allowing jury to take partial deposition
into deliberations was waived); State v. Solomon, 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807, 810 (Utah 1939)
(although transcript of witness's former testimony properly used to impeach him, it was
prejudicial error to give it to jury); State v. Jovenal, 573 P.2d 515, 518 (Ariz. App. 1977)
(harmless error to give jury transcript of defendant's testimony); Stidem v. State, 272 S.E.2d
338,340 (Ga. 1980) (defendant failed to preserve claim that his written statements to police
were erroneously allowed to go out with jury); State v. Proctor, 221 S.E.2d 556, 559 (Ga.
1975) (harmless error to allow witness's statements "to go out with the jury during its
deliberations"); Pope v. State, 399 S.E.2d 552, 553 (Ga. App. 1990) (error to allow jury to go
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out with transcript of sex crimes defendant's conversation at sheriffs department); Dunn v.
People, 50 N.E. 137,138 (111. 1898) (error to give jury signed, dying declaration of murder
victim); State v. Wilson, 360 P.2d 1092, 1098-1099 (Kan. 1961) (prejudicial error to allow
jury to examine transcript of rape victim's testimony); State v. Lord, 84 P.2d 80,95-96 (N.M.
1938) (harmless error "for the court to permit the jury to take the confessions and admissions
introduced into evidence, to the jury room for their consideration in retirement");
Commonwealth v. Ware, 20 A. 806, 808 (Pa. 1890) (upholding trial court's denial of jury's
request to "send out to them the testimony of [witness]" in a murder prosecution); State v.
Payne, 227 N.W. 258,263 (Wis. 1929) (harmless error to allow jury to consider "typewritten
notes of stenographer who took [defendant's] statements and her typewritten transcript
thereof); Schmunkv. State, 714P.2d724, 744 (Wyo. 1986) (prejudicial error to send to jury
room, videotape of defendant's refusal to take polygraph).
No Prejudice. Finally, even if it were error to have allowed the jury to take Linda's
handwritten statement into the jury room, that error was harmless. Defendant argues that the
alleged error was prejudicial because it was unnecessarily cumulative and in effect resulted
in undue emphasis being given to the handwritten statement. Aplt. Br. at 16-20.
Contrary to defendant's argument, the Utah Supreme Court and other courts have
consistently recognized that exhibits or other evidence erroneously admitted are harmless if,
as here, they contain only evidence that the jury has already properly heard. See, e.g., State
v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, \ 37, 61 P.3d 1019 (harmless error to admit medical examiner's report
because "[tjhere was nothing in the report that added to or detracted from the medical
19

examiner's testimony"); Carter, 888 P.2d at 643-44 (harmless error to admit transcript
abstract as exhibit, in part, because most of the transcript had already been read to the jury),
State v. Thomas, 111 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1989) (harmless error to allow police officer to
testify of victim's prior consistent statements because it was merely cumulative to victim's
testimony); Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp,, 21 F.3d 721, 731 (6th Cir. 1994)
(harmless error to admit portion of expert witness's report because there was nothing in it that
had not already been testified to); United States v. Juarez, 549 F.2d 1113,1114 (7th Cir. 1977)
(defendants not prejudiced by admission of police reports where substance of reports had
already been testified to).
Here, defendant acknowledges the jury "heard the written statement implicating
[defendant] repeatedly during trial and was twice permitted to view the written statement
during trial before ever taking it into deliberation for further review." Aplt. Br. at 19 (citing
R92:26-30,42,67-68,155-156). Given that the jury had already heard everything contained
in Linda's statement more than once, it cannot be said that it's admission made any difference
on the outcome of this trial.
Finally, even without Linda's hand-written statement defendant would have been
convicted. He admitted to Officer Burke over the phone that he was the driver the officer had
tried to stop, and also explained why he drove away. R92:69,92-96. Defendant also matched
the description of the driver and it is undisputed that car belonged to defendant's girlfriend,
Linda. R92:12, 66-67. Thus the jury could have reasonably inferred defendant was guilty,
even without Linda's hand-written statement.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's jury convictions for failure to stop and speeding should be affirmed.
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Addendum
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WEST VALLEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT.
op*3>
Witness Statement
tflXlMK
(Testimonio Escrito)
Case#
D.O.B.(Fecha De Nacimiento)_

ame(Nombre)_

^Business Phone(De Trabajo)_

ione(TeIephono)_
Dcation of Incident(Donde Ocurrio)_

Pursuant to Rule 1102, Utah Rules of Evidence and Section 76-8-504 J, Utah Code Annotated:
^OU ARE NOTIFIED THAT STATEMENTS YOU ARE ABOUT TO MAKE IN THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE PRESENTED TO
k MAGISTRATE OR A JUDGE IN LIEU OF YOUR SWORN TESTIMONY ATA PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. ANY
FALSE STATEMENT YOU MAKE AND THAT YOU DO NOT BELIEVE TO BE TRUE MAY SUBJECT YOU TO CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT AS A CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR,
Conforme a la regla 1102, de evidencia de Utahy la seccione 76-8-504.5, del codigo de Utah anoto:
Le Notifican que las declaraciones que usted esta a punto de hacer en este documento se pueden presentar a un magistrado o a un
uez en lugar de su testimonio jurado en una examination prehminar. Cvalouier declaration falsa que usted haza v que usted no
:rea que sea verdadero, puede ser usted su jeto a un castigo criminal como delito menor de la clase "A".
[ understand the above statement(Entiendo antedicha la declaration)
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